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Scientific Representation, Denotation, and Fictional Entities 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
I critically review RIG Hughes’ Denotation-Demonstration-Interpretation account of 
scientific representation, focusing in particular on the representation of fictional entities 
in science. I find the original account lacking, but argue that it can be extended in 
suitable ways. In particular I argue that an extension of this account that weakens the 
denotation and interpretation conditions can accommodate fictions. This extension also 
reveals the essential deflationary nature of scientific representation, by bringing into 
relief the functional roles of denotation and interpretation.  
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Introduction 
 
The influential Denotation-Demonstration-Interpretation (DDI) account of 
representation was developed in a short pioneering paper by RIG Hughes (1997). My 
purpose in this paper is to assess the DDI model in light of present day interest on the 
nature of fictional entities in science. I argue that the DDI model faces an 
insurmountable difficulty in dealing with such entities. However, an extended version of 
the DDI account may accommodate fictional entities. While the resulting account is 
more complex, this may just reflect the complexity of representation itself. In addition 
the extended version is clearer with respect to the key question regarding the 
deflationary nature of representation, since it makes it patent that representation is not a 
relation between its source and target systems, but a functional property of models 
within a representational practice.  
 
In the first section, I review the original DDI proposal, emphasizing the role that 
the relation of denotation plays in this proposal. In the second section, I discuss and 
emphasize the deflationary nature of the DDI account. In section 3 I briefly review 
some examples of scientific fictions, particularly Maxwell’s vortex model of the ether, 
and show that the DDI account fails to accommodate them. I argue instead for a 
weakening of the denotation and interpretation relations into correlative functional 
notions. The conclusion emphasizes the deflationary nature of the suitably extended 
account, and how it reveals that representation is not a relation per se, although it can be 
instantiated by means of certain relations in certain contexts. 
 
 
1. The Denotation-Demonstration-Interpretation (DDI) account  
 
The DDI account of representation was introduced by RIG Hughes in his now 
classic paper (Hughes, 1997). In order to outline and assess the DDI account we need 
first to fix some neutral terminology. We shall say that, in model-building science, a 
model source A typically represents a target B. This terminology implies no constraints 
on what types of objects A and B may be: These may be concrete or abstract, physical 
or mathematical, real or imaginary. Neither does it preclude the standard view 
according to which any scientific model must have a target in the real world and 
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represent it via relations that hold between the properties of both source and target. 
Indeed, as discussed below, the standard view is constitutive of representation on most 
substantive accounts, which take representation to be a relation – and hence take both 
relata to be real. Yet, the terminology also leaves room for other views that do not 
require sources or targets (or both) to be real, and hence do not require representation to 
be a relation.  
 
 In other words many types of objects can play the role of representational 
sources – from concrete physical objects and diagrams to abstract mathematical 
structures or laws. And in addition, an indefinite number of different sources may 
represent one and only one target. Thus a concrete array of small balls carefully strung 
together by means of wires and Kepler’s mathematical laws can both meaningfully 
represent the solar system, albeit to very different degrees of accuracy. Similarly for 
targets, the variation here can be large. Some models represent concrete physical 
systems and their dynamical evolution, such as the solar system; other models represent 
more general phenomena, or effects, such as the Ising model for phase transitions; or 
abstract properties, such as the second law of thermodynamics, which represents 
entropy as necessarily increasing in closed systems. 
   
 What do all these instances of ‘scientific representation’ have in common? This 
has not been an easy question to answer and there are a number of different proposals. 
We may, however, classify the proposals available in roughly two different kinds: 
substantive and deflationary. 1  Substantive approaches answer the question in terms of 
the properties of sources and targets – and their relation – that constitutes 
representation. By contrast, on a ‘deflationary’ approach there is in fact no substantive 
or explanatory property or relation that constitutes representation. What is rather in 
common between the different cases of representation is the cognitive role or function 
that sources play vis. a vis. their targets – i.e. the uses that they are put to by agents 
towards their specific goals in their particular contexts of inquiry. And that’s that. There 
are no further conditions lurking, as it were, in the background. Hughes’ DDI account 
is, at least prima facie, an approach to representation of this deflationary kind. 
                                                        
1 For an elaboration of the distinction between deflationary and substantive 
accounts, see Suárez (2010) and, particularly Suárez (2014) of which the above is 
an abbreviated version. 
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 The DDI account takes it that scientific modelling is a hybrid notion, containing 
both elements characteristic of a relation and others more of a piece with an activity. On 
this view, a source A represents a target B when the following three conditions are met: 
i) The source denotes the target; ii) A demonstration is carried out on the model; and iii) 
The results of this demonstration are then interpreted in terms of the target.  
 
 Hughes vividly illustrates these elements by reference to the model that Galileo 
introduces in the Third Day of his Discourses Concerning Two New Sciences. Galileo 
there describes a kinematical problem in geometrical terms, solves the problem in 
geometry, and then applies the solution back to the original kinematical problem. In 
particular he concludes that the space s traversed by a body in uniform motion with 
constant velocity in a given interval t is equal to that traversed by a uniformly 
accelerated body initially at rest, provided that the final speed of the accelerating body 
is twice that of the body in uniform constant motion. In terms of the DDI model, he 
reasons as follows. First, the kinematical situation must be described by means of a 
geometrical diagram that therefore denotes it (Figure 1). Thus Galileo denotes the time t 
that the body takes to traverse the space s by means of the segment AB of a line, and the 
speed of the body at any instant of the interval t by another segment of a line 
perpendicular to the first line. Thus AC denotes the speed of the body at A and BD the 
speed of the body at B. Second, a demonstration must be carried out on the diagram. 
Galileo demonstrates that the area of a rectangular shape ABCD is identical to the area 
of a triangle ABD’ where D’ is twice the value of D. Finally, the result is interpreted 
back in the terms of the original kinematical problem, by conceiving the overall area 
covered as the space traversed by the body in its motion over the t interval. Thus Galileo 
concludes that the time t that a body in uniform motion takes to traverse s is identical to 
the time taken by a body uniformly accelerated. QED. The three stages in Galileo’s 
reasoning coincide neatly with the denotation, demonstration and interpretation stages 
in the DDI account.  
 
 2. The Deflationary Nature of the DDI model 
 
 Hughes presents the DDI account in a rough and ready way as a deflationary 
approach to representation because he explicitly refrains from postulating necessary 
5 
 
conditions in terms of robust relations between sources and targets (1997, p. 329): “Let 
me forestall possible misunderstandings. I am not arguing that denotation, 
demonstration, and interpretation constitute a set of speech acts individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient for an act of theoretical representation to take place”. This is to 
deny that the DDI account provides us with a substantive explanatory property since it 
does not even provide necessary and sufficient conditions. 2 Nevertheless, there are a 
few features of the DDI account that may lead us to question the strength of its 
commitment to deflationism.  These features all follow from the surprising appeal to 
denotation, which is commonly understood as a substantive relation between the 
denoting sign and the denoted object. 3 
 
 Hughes’ account may be summarized in a schema (figure 2) which should not 
hide its hybrid nature. Denotation is a relation between a source and a target; while 
demonstration and interpretation seem best understood as activities on the part of an 
interpreter / user. There is, of course, an activity of denoting – but this is commonly 
understood to either establish a relation, or ride upon an already established one. In 
other words, we may not use A to denote B without ipso facto establishing a relation of 
denotation between A and B. The relation substantially informs the notion of 
representation at play, as revealed by our use of the language. For instance, we speak of 
the geometrical diagram as in itself denoting the kinematical problem, independently of 
any activity carried out by Galileo, as if the relation of denotation was entirely 
independent of anything we can actually do or not with it. There is at least prima facie a 
question here regarding the nature of the relation that informs this conception of 
representation. The contrast is great with the notion of demonstration, which can only 
be conceived as a piece of reasoning carried out by someone entirely within the ‘space 
of reasons’ provided by the model source. It seems hopeless to attempt to interpret this 
as a relation, since at this stage of the modelling process, the target may not taken into 
consideration at all. So, on the DDI account, in order for the geometrical model to 
represent (for us) the kinematical situation, we must carry out Galileo’s demonstration 
ourselves. It would not seem to be true that “there is a demonstration out there, waiting 
                                                        
2 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Suárez (2014). 
3 Goodman (1976); see also Elgin (1996, 2009). 
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for us to apprehend it”. Here, by contrast with the denotation part, the activity itself is 
constitutive of representation, and there is no relation that may stand in its place. 
 
 The third element in the DDI account appears less clear-cut. In model theory, of 
instance, the notion of ‘interpretation’ may be understood as a relation: 4 It is a function 
mapping the elements of the language into a domain of independent entities endowed 
with their own properties. Hence, take a set of sentences in some particular language; 
the ‘interpretative mapping’, on this account, provides them with a ‘semantics’ under 
which they may be said to be true or false. But it is doubtful that this is the same 
‘interpretation’ that is involved in the DDI account, since to the extent that the model 
source contains sentences at all, they already come fully interpreted in terms of the 
model itself. It seems more appropriate to think of it as an instance of ‘application’: it 
applies the model source to the target in order to derive results of interest regarding the 
target itself. Now, there is no doubt that the application of the model is constrained by 
the relation of denotation established in the first stage of the DDI account, but it also 
brings a large degree of freedom in two respects at least. Firstly, the denotation relation 
by itself does not stipulate which parts of the target object correspond to which parts of 
the source object, and there is always plenty of leeway at this point. In the Galileo 
example the mere fact that the geometrical diagram denotes the kinematical situation 
does not settle which parts of the diagram stand for which parts of the kinematics. But 
more importantly the mere fact of denotation does not determine how the source is to be 
conceived in the first place, i.e. how it is to be divided into parts that can then be related 
to the target. And it is, however, clear that the application of the source to the target 
does require a partition of the source into relevant parts and properties (a “structure”), 
and the relating of such “structure” to a similar “structure” of parts and properties in the 
target. Thus in Galileo’s modelling example, the geometrical diagram must clearly 
distinguish vertical and horizontal lines at every point, and the area therein comprised. 
Similarly the kinematical problem must clearly identify time intervals, speed of motion 
at every instant, and constant or accelerated motion across the interval. Etc. 
 
 In other words, ‘interpretation’ requires at least two types of activity on the part 
of the modellers. First, it requires the ascribing of some structure to the source and 
                                                        
4 For instance see Chang and Kleiser (1990, p. 20ff). 
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target objects, by judiciously partitioning them into an appropriate set of features and 
their properties. Second, it calls for a mapping of the elements of the source structure 
onto some corresponding parts and properties of the target, again under some suitable 
partition, which is typically ascribed on pragmatic grounds. 5 Both steps (‘partitioning’ 
and ‘mapping’) are activities within the modelling practice without which interpretation 
is impossible.  However, only mapping issues in a sort of relation akin to denotation 
between (elements of) the source and (elements of) the target. Therefore, on the DDI 
account, modelling is a hybrid of a relation (denotation, mapping), and a number of 
activities (demonstrating, ascribing, partitioning). The activities are a part of some 
normative practice of modelling, but the relations seem independent of that practice. 
They are at least conceptually distinct since they can be in principle described without 
appeal to the practice itself.  
 
A deflationary strategy would recommend replacing both denotation and mapping with 
functional activities or features of the representational practice as well. I have argued 
(Suárez, 2014) that there are functional replacements for both denotation and mapping, 
referred to as denotative and inferential function respectively. The resulting Denotative 
Function-Demonstration–Inferential Function (or DFDIF) account is more faithful to 
modelling practice because it relates all its various components directly to a number of 
salient features of the practice of model building. In addition, as I discuss in the next 
section, it possesses the additional advantage to deal with fictional entities in science in 
a natural fashion.  
 
 
 3. The DDI Model and the Role of Fictions in Modelling 
 
 The recent modelling literature emphasizes how scientific models can represent 
fictional or imaginary entities, processes, or phenomena. There is no need to review any 
of the case studies in detail; their upshot is that any adequate account of scientific 
representation must accommodate representations with fictional or imaginary targets. 
To give just one illustrious example, Maxwell’s famous vortex model of the ether is of 
course a representation; and it is a representation even though the various components, 
                                                        
5 See e.g. Van Fraassen, 2008, Ch. 6. 
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including for that matter the ether itself, have a rather dubious ontological status. 6 Thus 
fictions are a key testing ground for any account of representation and particularly so 
for those that presuppose representation is a relation. Thus the requirement of 
denotation would rule out fictional representation. However, Elgin (2009, pp. 77-78) 
has emphasised that this requirement can be weakened: “A picture that depicts a 
unicorn, a map that maps Atlantis, and a graph that charts the increase in phlogiston 
over time are all representations, although they do not represent anything. To be a 
representation, a symbol need not itself denote, but it needs to be the sort of symbol that 
denotes”. That is to say, a source may function ‘as a representation’ without actually 
denoting its target. It is enough that the source has “denotative function”, and this 
function can be carried out without eventuating in actual denotation. In other words, one 
crucial difference between denotation and denotative function is that the former is a 
success term (for it is impossible for it to be true that ‘x denotes y’ unless y is real) but 
the latter is not (since ‘x has denotative function and its purported denotation is y” may 
be true even though y is not real but imaginary or fictional). And while the former 
(denotation) requires the latter (denotative function) the converse is not true: Denotative 
function does not require successful denotation – not even in the long term or in a 
hypothetical future.  
 
 The comparisons with art are very pertinent and enlightening on this point, 
which surely explains why they get recurrently used in this regard. A portrait always has 
denotative function but does not always denote. Velázquez’s portrait of Pope Innocent 
VI both denotes and has denotative function; but it would be a mistake to say of any of 
the series of canvasses that it inspired Francis Bacon to produce that it also denotes in 
spite of the obvious fact that they too are portraits. Or, consider the case of Leonardo’s 
Mona Lisa, which notoriously raises historical questions concerning whom exactly it 
denotes, and how. These questions are logically and historically independent of the 
uncontroversial fact that the portrait has denotative function. Similarly, Maxwell’s 
models of the ether may not denote anything. We nowadays take them to have no 
referent, even though Maxwell, like any other 19th century physicist – at least at the 
time that he introduced the vortex model of the ether – was certainly committed to a 
                                                        
6 For more case studies see the various essays contained in Suárez, 2009; Woods, 
2011. For a discussion of Maxwell’s (1961/2) model, see e.g. Nersessian (2008). 
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carrier of electromagnetic waves. Yet, his attitude to both vortexes and particularly idle 
wheels was more nuanced. He thought of both as useful analogies but not as literal 
descriptions of the mechanisms underlying electromagnetic phenomena. In spite of all 
this, the models seem to function undeniably in a representational fashion. More 
particularly, there is no substantial difference between the methodology employed for 
both demonstration and application in such ‘fictional’ models and the methodology 
employed in non-fictional models, such as that employed by Galileo. The same patterns 
and rules of inference seem perfectly to apply in both cases regardless of whether or not 
denotation obtains. Since denotative function allows us to account for a much larger 
family of bona fide scientific representations it seems reasonable to substitute 
denotative function in an appropriately extended version of the DDI account. In other 
words there is a striking asymmetry between “denotative function” and “denotation” 
that is best understood perhaps, in comparing the concepts’ respective extensions, since 
the extension of the former strictly includes the extension of the latter. (No denoting 
symbol fails to also be in the set of those symbols that possess denotative function; but 
the converse is not true.) 7 
 
 The nature of denotative function may now be further clarified. For as was noted 
earlier in the paper, one thing that stands in the way of a deflationary reading of 
Hughes’ original DDI account is the appeal to denotation. A deflationary account of any 
concept eschews any reference to any substantive relation between that concept and 
anything else other than the use of the concept, or the norms that inform such use. There 
can be no explicit or covert appeal in its definition to a relation between the concept and 
the world – beyond the aspects of the world that constitute or inform use. Thus on a 
deflationary account, ‘representation’ is not understood as a relation between 
representational models, on the one hand, and facts, states, effects, phenomena, etc, on 
the other hand. It is instead essentially related to features of the use of representations. 
And this is exactly where the crucial difference between denotation and denotative 
function has bite. While denotation is a relation between symbols in a language system 
and their putative referents, denotative function is merely a feature of our use of those 
                                                        
7 Note that the asymmetry does of course not entail that denotative function is in 
the end also a success term. Denotative function is a more general term that covers 
cases of successful denotation and cases of unsuccessful denotation alike. Hence it 
is not per se a success term, even though of one of its subclasses certainly is so.  
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symbols. More specifically, a symbol has denotative function if its use within some 
symbolic practice is in accordance with the typical norms applied to denotative symbols 
in that practice. In other words, what matters for denotation is whether the putative 
relation obtains; but what matters for denotative function is independent of whether or 
not the relation obtains. It depends exclusively on features of our use of symbol 
systems. 8 Consequently, the revised DFDIF account is deflationary also in the sense of 
connecting all the essential features of representation to some features of use within 
representational practice.  
 
 The “mapping” relation involved in the original DDI account is susceptible to a 
similar deflationary strategy (see Suárez, 2014, pp. 10-11). The crucial function of this 
‘mapping’ relation is to allow for a transfer of the results of the demonstrations carried 
out on the source over to the target. Thus in Hughes’ Galileo’s model example, the 
overall area of the triangle is interpreted as the space traversed by the body in its motion 
over the t interval. This is a sort of mapping that thus connects an element in the source 
system (area in the geometrical figure) with an element in the target system (space 
traversed by the body in motion in the kinematical system). The point of this mapping 
in practice is to allow some inferences with respect to the target, and in particular the 
inference that the time t that a body in uniform motion takes to traverse s is identical to 
the time taken by a body uniformly accelerated to a greater speed. Thus the ‘mapping’ 
relation’s functional role is to constrain the set of inferences about the target that may be 
performed on the basis of a consideration of the source about the target – i.e. what is 
technically known as the set of legitimate surrogative inferences. 
 
 The deflationary thought is then that this constraint can be stipulated 
independently of any actual relation between the source and the target. In other words, 
“taking area to stand for space traversed” sets up a rule of inference with, amongst 
others, the conclusion that equal areas correspond to equal times travelled. It is still the 
case that certain claims about the source get transferred over to claims about the target, 
                                                        
8 See Elgin (2009, p. 78) for a similar distinction as applied to what she refers to as 
‘P-representations’ as opposed to ‘representations-of-P’. The latter are defined by 
their relation to a particular kind of things, while the former are, by contrast, 
defined entirely in terms of features of symbol systems – so belonging in that class 
is entirely determined by compliance with the norms of use within a practice.   
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but note that this transference is achieved without any need for an independently 
existing actual ‘relation’ or mapping between the source and target. The transference 
instead, on this view, maps a set of claims about the source over to a set of claims about 
the target.  But a mapping between claims of some sort and claims of some other sort 
does not require any relation between the objects of those claims. In particular, a 
mapping between claims about A and claims about B does not require that B, or A for 
that matter, be real entities.  
 
 To be sure, the discussion above presupposes the standard metaphysical account 
of relations, whereby a relation between A and B requires both A and B to be real. It 
may be possible to weaken this postulate by e.g. requiring existence but not physical 
reality, or by not requiring existence at all. Thus on some accounts abstract entities may 
enter into relations, even though they are not concrete physical entities; and on some 
other accounts relations can obtain even amongst fictional entities that do not exist 
either as concrete physical entities, abstract entities, or any other way. In either of these 
cases, the account above regarding claims about A and B requiring no relations would 
be trivially false, and nothing would be gained in pursuing the deflationary strategy. 
However, this weakening of the standard metaphysics of relations patently amounts to 
exactly the same deflationary strategy as applied to the very notion of relation. So in 
fact the same deflationary strategy is enacted here, but at an earlier stage. Hence it is 
clear that some deflationary strategy will need to be implemented at some or other stage 
for the claim above to go through regarding claims in the absence of mapping relations 
between their objects. Whatever strategy that is, it will see the ‘mapping’ between 
source and target as merely an inference generation rule that determines the legitimate 
move from claims about the source to claims about the target. Talk about ‘mapping’ 
then is only genuinely responsive to talk about such inferential rules, and a ‘mapping’ is 
acceptable (or not) if the rule that it enacts is correspondingly acceptable (or not). It is in 
particular not possible to assess the propriety of the mapping independently, as it were – 
by merely looking into the source and target properties and assessing their similarity or 
resemblance. For the critical aspect of the ‘mapping’ does not lie in any relation 
between their properties but rather in the generation rule for inferences that it enacts. 
And while it is possible that the inference generating rules laid down also coincide with 
a genuine mapping between aspects of a real source and a real target, this mapping is of 
a piece with the set of generating rules and not independent or prior to it. In particular it 
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need not coincide with any recognizable antecedent similarity or resemblance. Thus in 
Hughes’s example of Galileo’s model, we would be at a loss to find any similarities or 
resemblances between the area of the geometrical figure and space traversed in a certain 
interval in the kinematical system – until of course the correspondence between area 
and space is set up, and the set of legitimate surrogative inferences is naturally revealed.  
 
 Elsewhere I have referred to this function as the surrogative inference generating 
function, or inferential function for short (Suárez, 2014, pp. 11ff.), and I have argued 
that it should take the place of the “interpretation” third stage in Hughes’ original 
account. The resulting Denotative Function – Demonstration – Inferential Function 
(DFDIF) account is an extension of the DDI account, suitably weakened to 
accommodate the representation of fictional entities such as Maxwell’s model of the 
ether. Maxwell’s vortex model is genuinely a representation of the ether, even though 
the ether is nowadays known not to be real. The model represents the ether because it 
has denotative function and its putative referent is the ether; and because it yields 
empirical predictions regarding the electromagnetic field when it is so interpreted in the 
light of the features of the ether. Such denotative and inferential functions are 
successfully carried out without any successful reference or denotation to the ether.  
They are carried out because the appropriate norms and rules of inference are enacted in 
the modelling practice that allows its correct use as a tool in inference. The model is 
used to all purposes ‘as if’ it denotes the ether and its elements are interpreted in the 
light of the features that the ether is assumed to possess. If a model of a fictional entity 
is functionally indistinguishable from a model of a real entity, then from a deflationary 
point of view it is properly a representation.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The DFDIF account here developed has two great virtues. Firstly, it accommodates the 
representation of fictional entities ubiquitous in scientific practice, which the original 
DDI model cannot do. And second, it displays the genuine deflationary nature of 
scientific representation. The role of ‘denotation’ and ‘interpretation’ is suitably 
weakened in this account into their corresponding functional roles. Since a 
representation can have denotative and inferential functions without actually denoting, 
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the DFDIF account is able to accommodate the representation of fictional entities in 
science. It also shows representation to be essentially deflationary: the carrying out of 
the appropriate functions in modelling practice is sufficient for representation. There is 
in particular no need for a relation to obtain between the source A and the target B. Of 
course, the target may be real, and a relation between source and target may obtain, 
even though it is not necessary for representation. Indeed many representational sources 
are similar to their targets in some relevant respects. In such cases, the relevant 
functions may be performed via this relation – but it is important to acknowledge that 
even in these cases representation is not constituted by the relation. On the account 
provided here, representation is instead constituted by its denotative, demonstrative and 
inferential functions in modelling practice. 
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Figure 1: Galileo’s geometrical model 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The DDI model 
 
